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Abstract—Integrating volatile renewable energy resources
into the bulk power grid is challenging, due to the reliability
requirement that at each instant the load and generation in
the system remain balanced. In this study, we tackle this
challenge for smart grid with integrated wind generation, by
leveraging multi-timescale dispatch and scheduling. Specifically,
we consider smart grids with two classes of energy users -
traditional energy users and opportunistic energy users (e.g.,
smart meters or smart appliances), and investigate pricing and
dispatch at two timescales, via day-ahead scheduling and real-
time scheduling. In day-ahead scheduling, with the statistical
information on wind generation and energy demands, we char-
acterize the optimal procurement of the energy supply and the
day-ahead retail price for the traditional energy users; in real-
time scheduling, with the realization of wind generation and the
load of traditional energy users, we optimize real-time prices to
manage the opportunistic energy users so as to achieve system-
wide reliability. More specifically, when the opportunistic users
are non-persistent, i.e., a subset of them leave the power market
when the real-time price is not acceptable, we obtain closed-
form solutions to the two-level scheduling problem. For the
persistent case, we treat the scheduling problem as a multi-
timescale Markov decision process. We show that it can be
recast, explicitly, as a classic Markov decision process with
continuous state and action spaces, the solution to which can
be found via standard techniques.
We conclude that the proposed multi-scale dispatch and
scheduling with real-time pricing can effectively address the
volatility and uncertainty of wind generation and energy de-
mand, and has the potential to improve the penetration of
renewable energy into smart grids.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivation
To address the grand challenge of a sustainable energy
industry, there has recently been a surge of interest in
alternative energy resources, including wind, solar, bio-fuel,
and geothermal energy. Ultimately, all these energy solutions
hinge heavily on smart grid technologies that are capable
of coordinating and managing dynamically interacting power
grid participants. There is therefore an urgent need to de-
velop a new generation of cyber-enabled energy management
system (EMS) and supervisory control and data acquisition
(SCADA), which can carry out reliable and possibly dis-
tributed management of these energy sources.
For normal operations of power systems, the precise bal-
ance between energy supply and demand is of the most
significance to system reliability. Integrating a large amount
of intermittent renewable energy resources (e.g., wind gener-
ation) into the bulk power grid has put forth great challenges
for generation planning and system reliability. In particular,
a complication that arises is that some primary elements of
renewable energy sources, such as wind and solar power,
are highly variable (stochastic) and often uncontrollable,
making it difficult to guarantee that the load and generation
in the system remain balanced at each instant. A mismatch
between supply and demand could cause a deviation of
zonal frequency from nominal value [1], and when it gets
severe power outages and blackouts may occur. Further, wind
generation is non-dispatchable, in the sense that the output
of wind turbines must be taken by all rather than by request.
Moreover, the volatility and intermittence makes it difficult
for system operators to obtain accurate knowledge of future
wind generations. Traditionally, system operators maintain
additional generation capacity and reserves (on-line or fast-
start), at additional costs, to address the supply uncertainty.
While the volatility of wind generation induces uncertain-
ties in the supply side of the power grid, an emerging class
of energy users, namely opportunistic energy users, induce
uncertainties on the demand side as well. It is noted in [2]
that over 10% daily energy consumption in United States
is from the usage of appliances such as water heater, cloth
dryers, and dish washers, which are envisaged to become
smart and be branded as opportunistic energy users, with the
following behaviors distinct from traditional energy users:
1) they access the energy system in an opportunistic manner,
according to the availability of system resources; 2) different
from the ‘always-on’ demand of traditional energy users, the
load profiles of opportunistic energy users can be bursty and
can be either inelastic or elastic; 3) opportunistic energy users
respond to the power market on a much finer timescale.
The prevalence of the new class of opportunistic energy
users, if utilized intelligently, makes demand side manage-
ment (DSM) a promising solution to reduce the costs incurred
by the deep penetration of wind generation [3]. Traditionally,
some energy users (e.g., residential and small commercial
users) pay a fixed price per unit of electricity that is estab-
lished to represent an average cost of power generation over
a given time-frame (e.g., a month), independent of the gener-
2ation cost. In contrast, under price-based DSM programs [4],
the retail prices are tied with the generation cost and may
vary according to the availability of energy supplies. Often
times, the energy market consists of a day-ahead market and
a real-time market for electricity. Simply put, the day-ahead
market produces financially binding schedules for the energy
generation and consumption one day before the operating
day. Further, the real-time market is used to tune the balance
between the energy amount scheduled day-ahead and the
real-time load. However, it is known that existing dynamic
pricing mechanisms (term of use, critical peak pricing, etc)
do not work well for handling generation uncertainty and
managing the demand uncertainty in a real-time manner (i.e.,
within minutes).
In this study, we will explore multi-timescale dispatch
and scheduling to address the following challenges: 1) the
supply uncertainty as a result of the volatility and non-
stationarity of wind generation; 2) the demand uncertainty
due to a large number of opportunistic energy users and
their stochastic behaviors; 3) the coupling between sequential
decisions across multiple timescales.
B. Summary of Main Contributions
Aiming to tackle the challenge of integrating volatile wind
generation into the bulk power grid, we study dispatch and
scheduling, for a smart grid model with two classes of
energy users, namely traditional energy users and opportunis-
tic energy users (e.g., smart meters or smart appliances).
We consider a power grid with both conventional energy
sources (e.g., thermal) and wind generation. Notably, wind
generation is among the renewable resources that has most
variability and uncertainty, and exhibits multi-level dynamics
across time. To enhance the penetration of wind energy,
we study multi-timescale dispatch and scheduling based on
a marriage of real-time pricing and multi-settlement power
market economics.
Specifically, the system controller performs scheduling at
two timescales. In the day-ahead schedule, with the statistical
information on wind generation and energy demands, the
operator optimally procures conventional energy supply and
decides the optimal retail price for the traditional energy
users, for the next day. In the real-time schedule, upon the
realization of the wind energy generation and the demand
from traditional energy users (which is stochastically depen-
dent on the day-ahead retail price), the controller decides the
real-time retail price for the opportunistic energy users.
In particular, we explore multi-scale scheduling for two
types of opportunistic energy users: the non-persistent and
the persistent users. The non-persistent users leave the power
market when they find that the current real-time price is
unacceptable, whereas the persistent opportunistic users wait
for the next acceptable real-time price. We obtain closed-form
solutions for the scheduling problem when the users are non-
persistent. For the persistent case, the scheduling problem is
a multi-timescale Markov decision process (MMDP) that we
recast, explicitly, as a standard Markov decision process that
can be solved via standard solution techniques. We demon-
strate, via numerical experiments, that the proposed two-
timescale dispatch and scheduling enables the penetration of
wind generation and hence improves the overall efficiency,
by enabling two-way energy exchange between providers and
customers, and by facilitating both information interaction as
well as energy interaction.
C. Related Work
Roughly speaking, related work falls into two major cate-
gories: the scheduling of power systems with wind generation
integration; and the pricing and management of opportunistic
users.
Very recent work [5] proposed risk-limiting dispatch in
contrast to worst-case dispatch for traditional generation
planning, by treating scheduling with known demand and
uncertain supply as a multi-stage decision problem with re-
course. With the same spirit, [6] proposed stochastic security
criterion in scheduling with wind generation. Specifically,
a scenario-based approach (a scenario is defined as the
trajectory of potential realization of future supply) is used
to minimize the expected aggregated social cost incurred by
all the scenarios in the scheduling horizon. Model predic-
tive dispatch of wind generation was studied in [7], which
treats future wind generation in the scheduling horizon as
a dynamic process specified by an ARMA model, aiming
to minimize the total generation cost subject to the physical
constraints of conventional generators. In a nutshell, all the
works noted above focus on managing the energy supply and
treat the energy demand as known (or statistically known) but
uncontrollable.
Real-time pricing in related works [4], [3] takes place on
the timescale of hours in conventional power systems, and
the price response of energy users are understood with some
high-level models. For a cyber-enabled energy system with
a large number of opportunistic energy users, clearly it is
more desirable to accomplish the price response and manage
the energy demand in a much finer timescale (e.g. minutes).
Indeed, this is one salient feature envisioned for future smart
grids, although this poses significant challenges for planning,
modeling, and controlling energy generation, transmission
and distribution.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section II, we describe the energy system model and give
a brief overview of the two-timescale settlement power
market. We study two-timescale dispatch and scheduling
when the opportunistic users are non-persistent in Section III.
In Section IV, we consider persistent opportunistic users
and formulate the scheduling problem as a multi-timescale
Markov decision process. We provide concluding remarks
and identify directions for future research in Section V.
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
We divide a 24-hour period into M slots of length T1 each,
where M > 1; and each T1-slot, in turn, consists of K slots,
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Fig. 1. An energy management system for smart grid with wind generation
and real-time pricing
each of length T2, with K > 1. For example, the T1-slots can
correspond to hours in a day and the T2-slots can correspond
to minutes. We begin with an introduction to the supply side
of the power system.
A. Energy Sources and Generation Costs
We consider a power grid with two kinds of energy
sources: the conventional energy (e.g., thermal) and the wind
energy. The conventional energy is, in turn, drawn from two
sources: base-load generation and peaking generation, with
generation cost c1 and c2 per unit, respectively1. Peaking
generation is typically from fast-start generators (e.g., gas
turbines), with a higher generation cost (c2 > c1). Due
to the start-up time and ramp rate of generators, the base-
load generators are scheduled day-ahead (24-hours ahead of
the corresponding time) for each T1 slot of the next day,
and the generation cost c1 contains start-up cost cp and
other operating costs. In real-time scheduling of each T2
slot, peaking generation and wind generation are used, as
needed, to clear the balance between demand and the base-
load generation.
Let D denote the aggregate energy demand (from both
traditional and opportunistic users) and W be the wind
generation amount, in a T2-slot. Let L = D−W denote the
net demand for conventional energy in a T2 slot. Suppose
that the system operator schedules a base-load generation
amount of S for a T1-slot and thus schedules s = SK for
each T2-slot within the T1-slot, for the next day. In real-time
scheduling, the system operator need to balance demand and
supply: 1) If L ≥ s, then system operator dispatches a base-
load generation of s and a peaking generation of L − s; 2)
Otherwise, the over-scheduled generation incurs a start-up
cost of cp per unit.
B. Day-Ahead Pricing and Real-Time Pricing
As is standard, dynamic pricing contracts between the sys-
tem operator and end-users are used to manage the demand of
both traditional energy users and opportunistic energy users,
on both T1 and T2 timescales. We consider the following
two-timescale pricing model:
1The wind energy is assumed to be cost-free, based on [8].
• Traditional energy users and opportunistic energy users
have separate pricing contracts: day-ahead pricing for
traditional users and real-time pricing for opportunistic
users, respectively;
• Day-ahead retail price: Traditional energy users are
informed, one day ahead, of the day-ahead prices u
corresponding to each T1-slot;
• Real-time retail price: opportunistic energy users re-
ceive the real-time retail prices v at the beginning of
each T2-slot;
• Both retail prices have price cap ucap and vcap, respec-
tively.
Note that besides the day-ahead pricing model for the tradi-
tional users, which was proposed in [4], we take a forward-
looking perspective to identify a new class of users, namely
the opportunistic energy users, and devise a real-time pricing
model for these users that is cognizant of the uncertainties in
the demand and supply. We discuss these uncertainties next.
C. Supply Uncertainty of Wind Generation
Wind generation is determined by the geographical and
meteorological conditions, and may assume high fluctuations
or relative steady patterns at different time-scales. Therefore,
wind generation are generally considered to be non-stationary
and volatile. Based on recent works [9], [10], the wind
generation can be modeled as a non-stationary Gaussian
random process across T1-slots, i.e., the wind generation
amount in kth T2-slot of mth T1-slot is given by
Wk,m ∼ N (θm, σ
2), (1)
where θm is the mean and σ2 is the variance. The statistical
information is available, one day ahead, to the day-ahead
scheduler. Indeed, this information is commonly provided by
the forecasting functions of EMS or commercial entities.
D. Demand Uncertainty under Real-time Pricing
In a T2-slot, the aggregated demand from energy users,
i.e., D, consists of two components: Dt from the traditional
energy users, and Do from the opportunistic energy users.
Demand model for traditional energy users: The demands
of traditional energy users could be known with reasonable
accuracy, and the short-term price response of demand is
well understood [11], [12]. Based on [13], we model the
energy demand of traditional energy users Dt in a T2-slot
as a random variable with mean depending on the day-ahead
price u:
Dt = E [Dt] + εt, (2)
with
E [Dt] = αtu
γt , (3)
where εt accounts for the uncertainty of Dt and γt is the price
elasticity of the traditional energy users at the corresponding
T1-slot. Price elasticity is traditionally used to characterize
the price response of energy users and is formally defined as
4the ratio of marginal percentage change in demand to that of
price, i.e.,
γt =
u
Dt
dDt
du
. (4)
Note that, for power systems, the price elasticity is negative,
and αt is the normalizing constant. Worth noting is that
αt and γt could be different for each of the T1-slots,
since traditional energy users’ demand and persistence for
consumption may depend on the term of the day (noon or
evening, peaking or off-peaking hours).
Demand model for opportunistic energy users: Under real-
time pricing, we assume that opportunistic energy users have
the following behaviors:
• Opportunistic energy users arrive according to a Poisson
process with rate λ0, which is constant within a T1-slot
but can vary across the T1-slots;
• Opportunistic energy users choose the access time ran-
domly and independently;
• In each T2-slot, an opportunistic user i arriving in the
system decides to accept or reject the announced real-
time price v by comparing with a price acceptance level
Vi. This price acceptance level is randomly chosen and
is i.i.d across the opportunistic users. Thus with N
denoting the total number of opportunistic energy users
in a T2-slot, the number of active opportunistic users,
Na, is given by
Na =
N∑
i=1
1{Vi≥v}; (5)
• Each active opportunistic energy user has a per-unit
energy consumption of Eo. Thus the total energy de-
mand from opportunistic energy users is given by Do =
NaEo;
• Under real-time pricing, the response of opportunistic
energy users may vary according to the applications.
Recent study [11] suggests that households respond to
high energy prices through energy conservation with
no load shifting, while [12] finds that most of the
commercial customers respond by load shifting to a
later time. With these insights, we consider two kinds of
opportunistic energy users: non-persistent and persistent,
of which the former leaves the system if the real-time
price is unacceptable, while the latter waits in the system
for a new real-time price in the next T2-slot.
E. General Problem Formulation
As illustrated in Fig. 2, we consider day-ahead scheduling
and real-time scheduling with non-stationary wind generation
over a horizon of M T1-slots, with the main objective being
to maximize the overall expected profit. We elaborate further
on multi-timescale dispatch and scheduling below.
In day-ahead scheduling, with the distributional informa-
tion of next-day wind generation, the system operator aims to
find a policy pi that dictates the two-timescale decisions S, u,
τ 1
T
2T 2T
1T
Day-ahead scheduling with the distributional 
information of W and D at T1 scale
Real-time scheduling and 
balancing at T2 scale
Non-stationary wind generation{
τ
Fig. 2. Multiple timescale scheduling with non-stationary wind generation
and real-time pricing
and v. A general formulation of the two-timescale scheduling
problem is provided below:
P : max
pi
M∑
m=1
Rum(pi), (6)
where, Rum(pi) is the total profit in a T1-slot under policy pi,
given by
Rum(pi) =
K∑
k=1
Epiψl
k,m
Rlk,m(ψ
l
k,m,pi), (7)
where Rlk,m is the net profit in the kth T2-slot of the mth
T1-slot (henceforth called the (k,m)th slot) and ψlk,m is the
system state in the (k,m)th slot, which is observable in
real time. When the opportunistic users are non-persistent,
ψlk,m consists of the wind energy and the energy demand
from traditional users. When the opportunistic users are
persistent, ψlk,m consists of wind generation and traditional
users’ energy demand, as well as the energy requests of
opportunistic users carried over from the previous T2-slot.
III. DISPATCH AND SCHEDULING WITH NON-PERSISTENT
OPPORTUNISTIC ENERGY USERS
Note that the energy procurement and retail price in day-
ahead schedule have significant impact on the real-time
retail price. The real-time pricing policy, in turn, affects the
optimization of the day-ahead schedule. This tight coupling,
underscores the need for joint optimization of the day-ahead
and real-time schedules. To this end, we take a “bottom-up”
approach in formulating the two-level scheduling problem.
Specifically, we first formulate the real-time scheduling prob-
lem, conditioned on the day-ahead scheduling decisions S
and u; and then introduce the day-ahead scheduling problem
while taking into account the real-time scheduling policy.
A. Real-time Scheduling on Timescale T2
Given the amount of conventional energy procurement S
and the day-ahead price u settled in day-ahead scheduling,
5together with the realizations of wind generation W and tra-
ditional energy demand Dt, the real-time scheduling problem
in a T2-slot is formulated as:
PRTnon−pst : max
v
Rl(ψl, s, u, v), (8)
where ψl = {W,Dt} is the system state and
Rl(ψl, s, u, v) = uDt + E
v
Do [vDo + 1A(−cps)
+ 1B(−cpǫ − c1(s− ǫ))
+ 1C(−c1s+ c2ǫ)] , (9)
where, recall that Do denotes the energy demand of op-
portunistic energy users. The quantity ǫ denotes the surplus
energy, given by
ǫ = W + s− (Dt +Do). (10)
The indicator function 1A corresponds to the event when the
wind energy is sufficient to meet the demands of both types of
users. Indicator 1B refers to the event when the wind energy
is not sufficient but the total of the scheduled traditional
energy and the wind energy is higher than the aggregate
demand Dt+Do, which necessitates the cancelation of part
of the scheduled generation from the base-line generators
incurring a penalty cp per unit for the canceled amount of
generation. Indicator 1C corresponds to the event that the to-
tal of scheduled baseline generation and the wind generation
is insufficient to meet the aggregate energy demand and the
controller must purchase the deficit energy from fast start-up
generators at a cost c2. Formally, the events are described
below:
1A =
{
1 if W ≥ Dt +Do
0 otherwise (11)
1B =
{
1 if 1A = 0 and ǫ ≥ 0
0 otherwise (12)
1C =
{
1 if ǫ < 0
0 otherwise (13)
B. Day-ahead Scheduling on Timescale T1
The day-ahead scheduling problem in the non-persistence
case is formally given by
PDAnon−pst : max
S,u
K∑
k=1
EWkE
u
Dtk
max
vk
[
Rlk(ψ
l
k, s, u, vk)
]
. (14)
where the inner maximization corresponds to the real-time
scheduling studied above. Since Wk and Dtk are indepen-
dent and identically distributed across the T2-slots, the day-
ahead scheduling problem in the non-persistent case can be
optimized by simply considering the snapshot problem in a
specific T2-slot, given by2:
PDAnon−pst : max
S,u
EWE
u
Dt maxv
[
Rl(ψl, s, u, v)
]
. (15)
2We drop the suffix k for notational simplicity.
C. Approximate Solutions
The tight coupling between the day-ahead and real-time
scheduling problems, along with the convolved nature of the
uncertainties involved, makes a direct joint optimization chal-
lenging. We therefore take an alternate approach and obtain
approximate solutions to the real-time schedule. Based on the
approximate real-time schedule, we propose solutions to the
day-ahead schedule. In light of the characteristics of practical
systems, we impose the following general conditions first.
• Condition A: Wind generation is not sufficient to meet
the total energy demand in the system.
Needless to say, under condition A, 1A = 0 in (9). Define
Y = s+W −Dt as the energy procurement for the demand
of opportunistic energy users, then (9) reduces to
Rl(ψl, s, u, v) = EvDo [(v − c2)Do − c1B(Y −Do)]
+ uDt − c1s+ c2Y, (16)
where c ∆= cp − c1 + c2.
We begin with an analysis of the real-time scheduling prob-
lem. Recall that the number of non-persistent opportunistic
energy users arriving in the T2-slot has a Poisson distribution,
with mean κ1 = λoT2. It follows that the number of users
that become active, denoted as Na, is also a Poisson random
variable with mean κ1P(V ≥ v).
Note that the price elasticity of the opportunistic energy
users, γo is given by
γo =
v
Na
dNa
dv
. (17)
The opportunistic energy users are said to be relatively
inelastic if −1 ≤ γo < 0, i.e., the percentage change in
demand is greater than that of price; otherwise, they are
relatively elastic. Further, let vmin be the highest price that
is acceptable to all opportunistic energy users.
Then, the solution to (17) is given by:
Na = N (v/vmin)
γo . (18)
Based on (5), it is easy to see
P(V ≥ v) ≈ αov
γo , (19)
where αo
∆
=v−γomin is the normalizing constant.
It is known [2] that, κ1 is typically large in practical power
systems, and hence, Na could be approximated by a Gaussian
random variable. Accordingly, the demand of opportunistic
energy users Do = NaEs follows a Gaussian distribution
N (qo(v), σ2o(v)), with
qo(v)
∆
= κ1αov
γoEo,
σ2o(v)
∆
= κ1αov
γoE2o . (20)
Plugging (20) in (16), we obtain
R˜l(ψl, s, u, v) = uDt − c1s+ c2Y + (v − c2) qo(v)
− (2π)−1/2cσo(v) exp
(
−y2/2
)
− c (Y − qo(v)) (1−Q (y)) , (21)
6where y ∆= Y−qo(v)σo(v) . Denote the real-time pricing policy that
solves the preceding equation by the mapping ϑ˜s,u : ψl → v,
where, recall that ψl is the system state {W,Dt}.
Using the statistical properties of the wind generation and
the opportunistic user demand, reported in literature, we
now further simplify R˜l(ψl, s, u, v). According to [14], the
standard deviation of wind generation, is of the same order as
the mean of wind generation. Typically, wind generation and
the demand of opportunistic energy users are comparable.
Observe from (20) that the variance of the demand of
opportunistic energy users is of the same order as its mean.
We conclude that σσo has the same order as the square root
of the average demand of opportunistic users. Thus, with
σ2Y = σ
2
t + σ
2
, it follows that σ2Y ≫ σ2o .
Recall that the opportunistic energy users are said to be
relatively inelastic if −1 ≤ γo < 0, i.e., the percentage
change in demand is greater than that of price; otherwise,
they are relatively elastic. Since the price elasticity can have
significant impact on σ2o and σ2Y , we proceed to study real-
time schedule for different cases of elasticity, with σ2Y ≫ σ2o .
Proposition 1. Suppose condition A holds. When the non-
persistent opportunistic energy users are relatively inelastic,
i.e., −1 ≤ γo < 0, the real-time pricing policy is given by
ϑ˜s,u(ψ
l) = vcap.
Proof: In practical power systems, according to [13],
[14], Dt and W usually have continuous, symmetrical and
unimodal probability distributions. Since σ2Y ≫ σ2o , intu-
itively, there exists a finite constant c0 ≥ 0, such that:
P ({Y − qo(v) ≤ −c0σo(v)}
∪{Y − qo(v) ≥ c0σo(v)}) ≈ 1, (22)
and3
Q(−c0) ≈ 1, Q(c0) ≈ 0, exp(−c
2
0/2) ≈ 0. (23)
If Y − qo(v) ≥ c0σo(v), (21) boils down to:
R˜l(ψl, s, u, v) = (v − (c1 − cp)) qo(v) + (c1 − cp)Y
+ uDt − c1s; (24)
When Y − qo(v) ≤ −c0σo(v), (21) simplifies to
R˜l(ψl, s, u, v) = (v − c2) qo(v) + uDt − c1s+ c2Y. (25)
It is clear that (24) and (25) are unimodal for v ∈
[vmin, vcap], both with peaks at v = vcap. This yields the
real-time pricing policy: ϑ˜s,u(ψl) = vcap.
Remarks: Note that the result in the preceding proposition
is intuitive, since, with the opportunistic users’ energy de-
mand being relatively insensitive (inelastic) to the announced
real-time price, the scheduler can maximize profit by simply
announcing the highest possible price, vcap.
3It is well-known that (23) is valid for c0 ≥ 3.
Proposition 2. Suppose condition A holds. When the non-
persistent opportunistic energy users are relatively elastic,
i.e., γo < −1, the real-time pricing policy ϑ˜s,u is given by
ϑ˜s,u(ψ
l) =


γo(c1−cp)
1+γo
if Y ≥ qo(γo(c1−cp)1+γo )
γoc2
1+γo
if Y < qo( γoc21+γo )
q−1o (Y ) o.w.
Proof: When γo < −1, σo(v) can be expected to
be much smaller than that in the inelastic case under the
same real-time prices. With this observation, we resort to
the certainty equivalence techniques [15]. By approximating
Do with its mean qo(v), the profit in real-time scheduling is
given by:
R˜l(ψl, s, u, v) = uDt − c1s+ c2Y + (v − c2) qo(v)
− c(Y − qo(v))
+, (26)
which achieves the optimum at:
v∗ =


γo(c1−cp)
1+γo
if Y ≥ qo(γo(c1−cp)1+γo )
γoc2
1+γo
if Y < qo( γoc21+γo )
q−1o (Y ) o.w.,
(27)
which yields the real-time pricing policy ϑ˜s,u in the elastic
case.
Remarks: Note that the first case, i.e., Y ≥ qo(γo(c1−cp)1+γo ),
points to a case with energy surplus, i.e., there is more energy
supply than the total demand from traditional and oppor-
tunistic users, whereas the second case is tied to a case with
energy deficit. Then, it is natural that the real-time price in the
first case depends on the penalty cp in canceling a scheduled
generation; and that the real-time price in the second case
is a function of the cost of fast start-up generation. Note
also that, in both cases, when the opportunistic users become
increasingly elastic, i.e., γo → −∞, the real-time price
progressively decreases to the minimum allowable prices, i.e.,
c1− cp and c2, respectively. This monotonic behavior of the
real-time price with respect to increasing elasticity comes at
no surprise, since, as γo → −∞, the average opportunistic
user demand qo(v) → 0, i.e., the opportunistic energy users
become more and more thrifty. Therefore, the scheduler must
offer power at increasingly cheaper prices, up to the lowest
possible price, to maximize profit.
Having established an approximate real-time scheduling
policy for both kind of opportunistic energy users, an ap-
proximate day-ahead schedule can be obtained by solving
the following single-stage optimization:
P˜DAnon−pst : max
S,u
EWE
u
Dt
[
Rl(ψl, s, u, ϑ˜s,u(ψ
l)
]
. (28)
where Rl is given by (9) and the expectations depend on the
exact stochastic models assumed for wind generation and
traditional users’ energy demand.
7Proposition 3. The optimal decision of P˜DAnon−pst is given
by
u∗ =
{
ucap if − 1 ≤ γt < 0
γt
1+γt
c1 if γt < −1,
S∗ = argmax
S
{
(c2 − c1)S +KE
v
W,D [(v − c2)Do
− c1B(S −K(αtu
∗γt + εt +Do −W ))]} .
Proof: We first show that ϑ˜s,u depend on S and u only
through s−EuDt [Dt]. For convenience, define:
s′ = s−EuDt [Dt].
Since Y = s′ +W − εt, it is clear from Proposition 1 and
Proposition 2 that the real-time pricing policy ϑ˜s,u depends
on the day-ahead decision only through s′. We denote this
policy as ϑ˜s′ : (W, εt) → v. With this insight, by using the
change of variable technique in (16), the objective function
of P˜DAnon−pst can be rewritten as
EWE
u
Dt
[
Rl(ψl, s′, u, ϑ˜s′(W, εt))
]
= f1(u) + f2(s
′) + c2EW [W ], (29)
where
f1(u)
∆
= αt(u− c1)u
γt , (30)
f2(s
′)
∆
= EW,εtE
ϑ˜s′ (W,εt)
Do
[
(ϑ˜s′ (W, εt)− c2)Do
− c1B (s
′ − εt −Do +W )
]
+(c2− c1)s
′. (31)
Let F denote the solution space for the objective function of
P˜DAnon−pst defined in (29). Thus
F = {(u, s′);u ≥ 0, s′ ≥ −αtu
γt}. (32)
It can be verified that u∗ defined in the proposition statement
maximizes f1(u). Define s′0 = −αtu∗
γt
, and let s′∗ maxi-
mize f2(s′). If we show that (u∗, s′∗) belongs to the solution
space F , then (u∗, s′∗) optimizes the day-ahead scheduling
problem in (29). Since u∗ ≥ 0, it is now sufficient to show
that s′∗ ≥ s′0. A sufficient condition to establish this is given
by
f2(s
′) ≤ f2(s
′
0), ∀ s
′ ≤ s′0. (33)
Under condition A, wind energy is not sufficient to meet the
total energy demand when day-ahead price is u∗, thus:
W < (−s′0 + εt) +Do. (34)
Therefore,
W + s′ < εt +Do, ∀ s
′ ≤ s′0. (35)
It follows that 1) W + s < Dt + Do, i.e., there is no
scheduled energy surplus, thus 1B = 0 in (29); 2) Using the
preceding statement, recalling the definition of Y , we see that
Y < qo(
γoc2
1+γo
). Thus, from Proposition 2, the optimal real-
time price ϑs′(W, εt) turns out to be a constant γoc21+γo , i.e.,
independent of the system state and the day-ahead decisions,
when the opportunistic users are relatively elastic. Also, for
the relatively inelastic case, we know from Proposition 1 that
the optimal real-time price is a constant vcap. Letting v0(γo)
denote this constant real-time price for both the elastic and
inelastic cases, respectively, we have
f2(s
′) = (c2 − c1)s
′ + (v0(γo)− c2)qo(v0(γo)), ∀ s
′ ≤ s′0.
(36)
Therefore, f2(s′) ≤ f2(s′0), ∀ s′ ≤ s′0, and (u∗, s′∗) indeed
lies in the feasible region F and hence optimizes the day-
ahead scheduling problem in (29). The optimal day-ahead
decision, S∗, can now be computed using s′∗ and u∗.
Corollary 4. When the non-persistent opportunistic energy
users are relatively inelastic, the complete two-timescale
scheduling decision is given by:
u∗ =
{
ucap if − 1 ≤ γt < 0
γt
1+γt
c1 if γt < −1,
S∗ = K
(
κ1Eov
γo
cap + αtu
∗γt − F−1Z (cp/c)
)
,
ϑ˜s,u(ψ
l) = vcap,
where F−1Z (·) denotes the inverse of the CDF of Z ∆= W−εt.
IV. DISPATCH AND SCHEDULING WITH PERSISTENT
OPPORTUNISTIC ENERGY USERS
We now study multi-timescale dispatch and scheduling
when the opportunistic users are persistent. Simply put, a
persistent opportunistic user waits in the system for a new
real-time price, in the next T2-slot, if the current real-time
price is not acceptable. We assume that the opportunistic
users are persistent across both T2 and T1 slots, and that
the opportunistic energy users that arrived in the day leave
the system at the end of the day.
Due to the persistent nature of the opportunistic users,
scheduling decisions in both T2 and T1-slots affect the system
trajectory and hence scheduling decisions in future time-
slots, across both timescales. Thus, the scheduling prob-
lem involves hierarchically structured control [16], with the
hierarchy defined across timescales. With this insight, we
treat the scheduling problem as a multi-timescale Markov
decision process (MMDP) [17] where decisions made in the
higher level affects both the state transition dynamics and
the decision process at the lower level, while decisions at
the lower level affect only the decisions made at the upper
level. The multi-timescale dispatch and scheduling problem
at hand is particularly unique in the following sense: the two
timescales do not overlap, since the upper level decisions
(day-ahead) are made in non real-time. Thus the upper level
scheduler does not have any direct observation of the effect
it has on the lower level system dynamics, until the horizon,
and make decisions solely based on stochastic understanding
of the behavior of the lower level process. These properties
make the two-timescale scheduling problem, with persistent
users, uniquely challenging. We now describe the problem in
detail.
8For day-ahead scheduling, the scheduler decides the energy
dispatch Sm and the retail price um for the mth T1-slot in the
next day. Recall that the day-ahead scheduler has an accurate
forecast of the expected amount of wind generation θm. We
define the system state, ψum, corresponding to the mth T1-slot
in the next day as ψum = {θm, Pum}, where Pum denotes the
number of persistent opportunistic users carried over from the
(m−1)th T1-slot. During real-time scheduling, the scheduler,
in each T2-slot, has knowledge of the wind generation and
the demand from traditional energy users, along with the
number of persistent opportunistic users carried over from
previous T2-slot. Based on this information, it must decide
a real-time price vk,m for the kth T2-slot in the mth T1-
slot, i.e., the (k,m)th T2-slot). We define the observable
(observable in real time) state of the system in (k,m)th T2-
slot as ψlk,m = {Wk,m, Dtk,m, P lk,m}, where Wk,m denotes
the wind generation in the kth T2-slot in the mth T1-slot ,
Dtk,m is the energy demand from traditional energy users in
the (k,m)th T2-slot, P lk,m denotes the number of persistent
opportunistic energy users carried over from the previous T2-
slot to the (k,m)th slot. Having explicitly defined the states
of the system for the day-ahead scheduling and real-time
scheduling, we introduce the optimality equations next. With
~Xm = [X1,m, . . . , XK,m], we have
V um(ψ
u
m) =
max
sm,um
{
E ~Wm, ~Dtm
[
max
~vm
{
E~Pm[
Rlk,m({ψ
u
m, ψ
l
k,m}, sm, um, vk,m)
]
+EPu
m+1
=P l
K,m
V um+1(ψ
u
m+1)
}]} (38)
As noted earlier, this is a MMDP over a finite horizon, with
sm, um being the upper level (slower timescale) decisions
and vk,m being the lower level decisions.
To mitigate the complexity of the MMDP problem, next
we exploit the structural properties of the multi-scale dispatch
and scheduling problem and recast it as a classic Markov
decision process (MDP) (e.g., [18]).
Proposition 5. With appropriately defined immediate reward
Rum and action space aum, the two-level scheduling problem
can be written as a classic MDP at the slower time-scale, as
below:
V um(ψ
u
m) = max
aum={sm,um,ζm}
{
Rum(ψ
u
m, a
u
m)
+E
{ψum,a
u
m}
Pum+1
V um+1(ψ
u
m+1)
}
.
We now proceed to discuss the transformation of the
two-level scheduling problem from a MMDP to a classic
MDP. In the two-level scheduling problem, recall that the
lower level decisions are essentially the mapping from the
realizations of wind energy, traditional users’ energy demand
and persistent opportunistic users to the real-time price,
i.e., ζk,m : {Wk,m, Dtk,m, P lk,m} → vk,m. Consider a
stationary real-time pricing rule within each T1 slot, i.e.
ζ1,m = ζ2,m . . . ζK,m, and denote this stationary mapping
by ζm. A key step is to view ζm as an action at the day-
ahead scheduling level, in addition to actions sm, um. With
this insight, we can simplify the MMDP into a classic MDP.
We elaborate further on this below.
The expected net reward from slot m ∈ {1, . . . , D} until
slot M in the day-ahead market is thus given by the Bellman
equation:
V um(ψ
u
m) = max
aum={sm,um,ζm}
{
Rum(ψ
u
m, a
u
m)
+E
{ψum,a
u
m}
Pu
m+1
V um+1(ψ
u
m+1)
}
(39)
where, recall, Eyx refers to the expectation over x conditioned
on y. The expectations used in the MDP formulation are
explicitly provided in (37). The terminal reward, V uM , is given
by
V uM (ψ
u
M ) = max
au
M
RuM (ψ
u
M , a
u
M ) (40)
Note that the immediate reward corresponding to mth T1-slot
is a function of the realized values of wind generation mean
(that is accurately forcast 24 hours ahead) and the number of
persistent opportunistic users carried over from previous T1-
slot. We now proceed to explicitly characterize the immediate
E
{ψum,a
u
m}
Pu
m+1
(.) = E
P l1,m=P
u
m
P l
2,m
E
P l2,m
P l
3,m
. . . E
P lK−1,m
P l
K,m
E
P lK,m
Pu
m+1
(.)
E
P lk,m
P l
k+1,m
(.) = EWk,mEDtk,mENk,mE
{Wk,m,Dtk,m ,Nk,m,P
l
k,m}
P l
k+1,m
(.)
E
{Wk,m,Dtk,m ,Nk,m,P
l
k,m}
P l
k+1,m
(.) =
Nk,m+P
l
k,m∑
P l
k+1,m
=0
(
P lk,m +Nk,m
P lk+1,m
)
(1 −Πvk,m)
P lk+1,m(Πvk,m )
(Nk,m+P
l
k,m−P
l
k+1,m)(.)
Πvk,m = P (V ≤ vk,m)
vk,m = ζ(Wk,m, Dtk,m , P
l
k,m)
E
{Nk,m,P
l
k,m,vk,n}
Nak,n
(.) =
Nk,m+P
l
k,m∑
Nak,m=0
(
P lk,m +Nk,m
Nak,m
)
(Πvk,m )
Nak,m (1−Πvk,m)
(Nk,m+P
l
k,m−Nak,m )(.) (37)
9reward Rum, for m ∈ {1, . . .M}:
Rum(ψ
u
m, a
u
m)
= V lk,m({θm, P
l
k,m}, a
u
m)|k=1 (41)
where, P l1,m = Pum by definition, and for k ∈ {1, . . . ,K},
V lk,m({θm, P
l
k,m}, a
u
m = {sm, um, ζm})
= EθmWk,mE
um
Dtk,m
Rlk,m(ψ
l
k,m = {Wk,m, Dtk,m , P
l
k,m}, a
u
m)
+E
P lk,m
P l
k+1,m
V lk+1,m({θm, P
l
k+1,m}, a
u
m), (42)
where VK,m is given by
V lK,m({θm, P
l
K,m}, a
u
m)
= EθmWK,mE
um
DtK,m
RlK,m(ψ
l
K,m, a
u
m). (43)
Note that the quantities Rlk,m and V lk,m can be regarded as
the immediate reward and the net reward at the lower level
MDP, if the problem is viewed as an MMDP. The quantity
Rlk,m is a function of the realizations of the wind generation,
the demand from traditional energy users and the number
of persistent opportunistic energy users carried over from
previous T2-slot. More specifically, we have that
Rlk,m(ψ
l
k,m, a
u
m)
= umDtk,n + ENk,mE
{Nk,m,P
l
k,m,vk,m}
Nak,m
[
vk,mDok,m
+1A(−cpsm) + 1B(−ǫk,mcp − (sm − ǫk,m)c1)
+1C(−c1sm + c2ǫk,m)
]
(44)
where Nk,m denotes the number of opportunistic users ar-
riving at the (k,m)th slot, and Nak,m denotes the number of
opportuinstic users that become active in slot (k,m). Dok,m
denotes the energy consumption by the opportunistic users
in slot (k,m). Recall that Eo denotes the energy demand per
active opportunistic energy user. Thus, we have
Dok,m = Nak,mEo (45)
The quantity ǫk,m denotes the surplus energy, given by
ǫk,m = Wk,m + sm − (Dtk,m +Dok,m). (46)
Recall, the real-time price vk,m is given by the mapping ζm
as
vk,m = ζm({Wk,m, Dtk,m , P
l
k,m}). (47)
The indicator functions 1A, 1B and 1C correspond to the
various deficit/surplus energy states, and were explicitly
defined in Section III.
Summarizing, we have shown that the two-timescale dis-
patch and scheduling problem with persistent users can be
recast as an MDP with continuous state and action spaces.
Using appropriate discretization techniques, we can reformu-
late it as a classic discrete state and action space MDP, which
can be solved optimally or near-optimally using various
solution techniques available in the literature [19].
V. NUMERICAL RESULTS
For concreteness, we now study, via numerical exper-
iments, the performance of the proposed multi-timescale
dispatch and scheduling policy. First, we define profit margin
as the ratio of the average net profit to the sales in a T2-slot.
We assume the opportunistic users are non-persistent.
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Fig. 3. Profit margin at various penetration levels of wind generation and
opportunistic demand (γo = −2)
In Fig. 3, the profit margin is plotted against various values
of the penetration of opportunistic users and penetration of
wind energy in the system with two-timescale scheduling.
We use price elasticity of −0.5 for traditional users and
−2 for opportunistic users. As expected, the penetration
of wind energy increases the profit margin since wind en-
ergy is harvested ‘cost-free’. In contrast, as the demand
of penetration of opportunistic energy users increases, the
profit margin decreases. To explain this, we first identify
the two principal events that lead to losses in the system
operator’s profit: (a) The penalty (cp) when a fraction of
the dispatched conventional generation is reverted; (b) the
loss of revenue when the dispatched energy S is insufficient
to meet the total energy needs and the operator purchases
energy from fast-start up generators at higher cost c2. The
uncertainty in opportunistic energy users’ demand is one of
the factors that could lead to either of these events. An
over-estimation of this demand in the day-ahead schedule
leads to event (a), while an underestimation of this demand
leads to event (b). In our experiments, since the demand
from traditional users is deterministic, the higher the demand
from opportunistic users, the higher the uncertainties on
the demand side and hence the higher the losses at the
system operator. This insight further underscores the need
for efficient pricing mechanisms that intelligently tackles the
ever-increasing uncertainties in the power system.
Fig. 4 compares the profit margins with and without
multi-timescale pricing for various values of wind energy
penetration levels, i.e., the ratio of the wind energy generation
to the total energy. In the benchmark system, without multi-
timescale price, all the users exhibit traditional response
to prices with the same price elasticity γ. The prices are
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Fig. 4. Profit margin with various elasticity (ru = 20%)
optimized by taking into consideration the statistics of the
traditional users’ demand and wind generation. Considering
the multi-timescale scheduling system, for fair comparison,
we assume that the opportunistic users have the same elas-
ticity as the traditional users in the system. We compare the
two systems for different values of γ. As expected, for a
fixed wind penetration level, for the same value of γ, the
profit margin is higher when real-time pricing is employed
to mitigate the uncertainties in demand and supply. Also, note
that, as the price elasticity increases, the opportunistic users
exhibit increasingly thrifty behavior essentially reducing the
profit margin for the operator. In addition, as expected, the
profit margin increases with wind penetration with or without
real-time pricing since wind energy is assumed to be cost-
free.
To summarize, numerical results suggest that two-time
scale scheduling effectively addresses the volatility of en-
ergy generation and the uncertainties in the demand from
opportunistic users. Additional insights include the following:
the profit margin of system operators increases with the
penetration level of wind and decreases with demand from
opportunistic users and that the elasticity of the opportunistic
users plays a major role in the power system design.
VI. CONCLUSION
Wind generation is among the renewable resources that
has most variability and uncertainty, and exhibits multi-
level dynamics across time. Aiming to tackle the challenge
of integrating volatile wind generation into the bulk power
grid, we study multiple timescale dispatch and scheduling,
for a smart grid model, via day-ahead scheduling and real-
time scheduling. In day-ahead scheduling, with the statistical
information on wind generation and energy demands, we
characterize the optimal procurement of the energy supply
and the day-ahead retail price for the traditional energy users;
in real-time scheduling, with the realization of wind gener-
ation and the load of traditional energy users, we optimize
real-time prices to manage the opportunistic energy users so
as to achieve system-wide reliability. More specifically, when
the opportunistic users are non-persistent, we obtain closed-
form solutions to the multi-scale scheduling problem. For the
persistent case, we treat the scheduling problem as a multi-
timescale Markov decision process, and then we show that it
can be recast, explicitly, as a classic Markov decision process.
We believe that the studies we initiated here on multi-
timescale dispatch and scheduling for integrating volatile
renewal energy into smart grids, scratch only the tip of
the iceberg. There are still many questions remaining open
to improve the penetration of renewable energy into power
grids, and we are currently investigating these issues along
this avenue.
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